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Advances, Systems and Applications

Table 2 Auction Related Notations

From: Double auction and profit maximization mechanism for jobs with heterogeneous durations in cloud federations

\(\hat {b}_{i}^{m}(t)\)

Actual price for cloud i to buy a type m VM in slot t

\(\hat {s}_{i}^{m}(t)\)

Actual price for cloud i to sell a type m VM in slot t

\(\lambda _{\kappa }^{m}(t)\)

The κ highest buy price for type m VMs

\(\zeta _{\kappa }^{m}(t)\)

The κ lowest buy sell for type m VMs

\(\overline {\alpha }_{ij}^{m}(t)\)

Available quantity of type m VMs for cloud i to buy from j

\(\hat {\alpha }_{ij}^{m}(t)\)

Actual quantity of type m VMs for cloud i to buy from j

\(\hat {\gamma }_{i}^{m}(t)\)

Actual # of type m VMs and corresponding time bought by cloud i, slot t

\(\hat {\eta }_{i}^{m}(t)\)

Actual # of type m VMs and corresponding time sold by cloud i, slot t