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Advances, Systems and Applications

Table 7 Comparative Analysis of the data integrity strategy of cloud storage

From: Investigation on storage level data integrity strategies in cloud computing: classification, security obstructions, challenges and vulnerability

Ref.

Objectives

Limitations

[88]

Public auditing, resist all external adversary, protect data from a malicious auditor

Due to the missing of data storing acknowledge verification, the reputation of the Cloud server may be destroyed

[89]

Public data integrity, error localization, replica level auditing, dynamic update

Due to missing of data storing acknowledge verification, the reputation of CS may be destroyed

[90]

Data integrity auditing, sensitive data hiding

Due to missing of audit message verification scheme, TPA can deceive user about audit message

[85]

Data auditing, privacy-preserving

Audit report needs to verify otherwise TPA may be malicious TPA

[61]

Data integrity, resist replay attack and MITC attack

Data privacy issue because after repeatedly passed challenging phase, CSP becomes capable of getting original data block

[87]

Public auditing, data integrity

Audit message verification scheme need to be presented otherwise TPA may be malicious

[86]

Data integrity for static data resist from the external adversary

The author assumes that TPA is a trusted one but practically not possible

[91]

Public auditing, data integrity, dynamic data operation

Acknowledgment message about insert, modification and deletion of data needs to verify otherwise CS may be malicious CS

[136]

Public auditing, dynamic big graph data operation

During verifying time of dynamic graph operations, data privacy is not properly maintained

[93]

Dynamic update, data integrity auditing, reply forgery and reply attack

An audit message verification scheme needs to be present otherwise TPA may be malicious TPA

[78]

Public auditing, data integrity

Audit message and acknowledge message verification scheme needs to be present otherwise TPA and cloud may be malicious

[97]

Public auditing, reduce computational overhead, resist adaptive chosen-message attack

Validation results need to be verified otherwise TPA may be malicious

[137]

Data integrity, privacy-preserving

An audit message verification scheme needs to be present otherwise TPA may be malicious TPA

[122]

Data integrity, resist forge attack

No effective and secure data integrity scheme is present to support the data deduplication process of fog and cloud node

[126]

Dynamic auditing, dynamic data operation, resist reply attack and replace attack

BLS signature is not suitable for a big data environment

[125]

Certificateless public verification

Searching time over encrypted outsourced data in blockchain system takes much time

[124]

Zero-knowledge public auditing, privacy-preserving

Not applicable for large scale big data and TPA don’t have the capability of auditing multiple user’s data simultaneously